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Abstract
The intensified frequency and magnitude of climate-related extreme events have
produced devastating disasters for many Air Force installations. A Program Management
Office is formed to organize and hasten the recovery of the affected installation; its longterm role is to develop and execute a facility and infrastructure recovery portfolio. Despite
the increased frequency of climate-intensified extreme events, there is no formal
organizational structure for a program management office. While the Department of
Defense has prioritized resiliency to climate change over the last two decades, these
initiatives tend to progress slowly due to various operational constraints. The aftermath of
Hurricane Michael's devastation of Tyndall Air Force Base in 2018 has identified the need
to highlight an event flexible Program Management Office structure that can be applied
across disaster types and locations. To inform this organizational structure, i.e.,
determining how many project managers are needed to execute the installation’s portfolio
efficiently and effectively, will vary depending on the scale of the subject installation’s
recovery from the event. This thesis reviews the post-disaster milieu and how it uniquely
affects the recovery portfolio by increasing complexity in the projects.
Using an Analytical Hierarchy Process and Multi-Attribute Utility Theory, a
complexity index is proposed to weigh each project in the portfolio by its complexity. The
project complexity index is vital to formulate a "knapsack packing” problem solved with
linear programming. The optimized solution identifies the number of project managers
required and assigns an appropriate workload to optimize recovery project oversight to
mitigate cost and schedule overruns. This work illustrates that with project inputs such as
iv

cost, period of performance, construction variety, and project interconnectedness, an event
and location flexible PMO manning determination tool can be built to determine the right
number of project managers to manage recovery.
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I.
Introduction
Climate change is expected to intensify extreme weather events. These weather
events include tropical cyclones, which are expected to produce extraordinary facilities and
infrastructure damage, tied to intensified flooding from storm surge and precipitation, and
increased sustained and peak wind speed. The United States Air Force has many exposed
installations on the Gulf and East Coasts and in the Pacific that contain infrastructure and
mission assets worth billions of dollars. Air Force stateside installations have suffered
catastrophic damage from a hurricane at least once every decade for the past 30 years, with
Hurricanes Andrew, Katrina, and Michael devastating Homestead AFB, Keesler AFB, and
Tyndall AFB, respectively. Despite this consistent trend, the recovery of affected
installations has been approached ad-hoc. The Air Force rarely uses organizational lessons
learned from previous disasters to drive decision-making, particularly as it pertains to the
staffing of recovery offices to efficiently steer the often large construction portfolios.
Independent of the disaster type, the Air Force historically uses a Program
Management Office (PMO) to establish and oversee the installation recovery mission.
While each disaster creates a unique workload and road to recovery, the work and fiscal
challenges are similar each time. The ad-hoc approach to organizational structuring of the
PMO results in suboptimal endowments of total staffing and expertise. Not having a
flexible PMO structure based on portfolio requirements established early in the recovery
process delays the onset of proper recovery management. Furthermore, it blurs the lines
between command and communication concerning what the PMO is supposed to manage
1

and how much human capital should be provided to ensure the quality of projects and rapid
restoration of key mission-generating functions. The ad-hoc approach requires that the
PMO determine all the organizational structure and staffing in a time-constrained
environment. The local installation and Civil Engineer Squadron (CES) rely on the PMO
to act as a capacity relief valve across the project process.
Lastly, the post-disaster environment presents unique challenges that further
complicate the ability of the PMO to generate and oversee projects. The most pressing of
these is demand surge brought about by the post-disaster economy and construction
resource constraints, which layers in additional complexity to a high visibility, large and
complex project portfolio. Quantifying this complexity would enable decision-makers to
more effectively staff PMOs with project managers to oversee the portfolio execution and
likely mitigate cost and schedule overruns.
Objectives
The objectives of this study are to (1) conduct a literature review of the post-disaster
environment targeting works that address mitigation measures for post-disaster
construction demand surge; (2) review project complexity as it applies to construction
management and project management as well as ways to quantify complexity and how
managing complexity can be optimized to reduce cost, and schedule overruns; and (3)
propose a human resourcing solution using optimization techniques, such as the Analytical
Hierarchy Process (AHP),

Multi-Attribute Utility theory (MAUT), and Linear

Programming. This resourcing solution is intended to give PMO decision-makers
2

quantitative and justifiable support for the request of project managers to execute the PMO
portfolio.
Research Approach
The cornerstone of this effort is the quantification of project complexity via an
AHP and MAUT-based complexity index. The index shall be used to evaluate a PMO
portfolio to direct optimal human resourcing. The complexity index accounts for key
parameters inherent in construction projects and captures contextual parameters from the
post-disaster environment. It is a critical factor in a linear programming optimization
problem, which can be thought of as a permutation of the classic multiple Knapsack
Problem, which produces an optimized project manager staffing solution. This model can
be implemented by future PMOs to optimize human resources to minimize project cost and
schedule overruns.
Subject matter expertise (SME) and stakeholder input were used to define several
parameters in the model. The SMEs consisted of several active PMO project managers, as
well as other Air Force civil engineers with ten or more years of experience. Their input
was received based on the scope of the research problem. Ultimately, considering the SME
input and existing body of work, the final parameters, and definitions of the model were
finalized by the author.
Research Scope, Assumptions, and Limitations
In this thesis, a fundamental assumption for the PMO is that it will form towards
the end of the immediate crisis response to the disaster and represent a transition to the
3

steady-state recovery operation (Figure 1), which is consistent with the emergence of
PMOs following the aforementioned storms for Keesler AFB and Tyndall AFB. However,
the transition between initial recovery and sustainment is not always crisp; while the PMO
may exist the tail-end of debris removal and roof tarping, most of these crisis mitigations
and temporary repair type contracts would be well underway as the PMO approaches initial
operating capacity. For example, mold remediation is a lengthy and invasive process and
is likely to bridge from the crisis response team oversight into the PMO's oversight. In
general, the PMO provides enough capacity to manage the recovery portfolio until the local
CES can resume at full capacity and manage the additional recovery portfolio.
Alternatively, there may be key metrics to sunset the PMO per the PMO charter or Air
Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) guidance.
Furthermore, this thesis intends to inform future PMO missions to jumpstart the
recovery by having a human resourcing model available, which can be calibrated to
portfolio requirements. The Tyndall PMO, and its portfolio project data, are used to
develop the basic framework and calibrate the model. Using the project data is not to assess
the Tyndall PMO directly but to create a generalized model and project manager resourcing
solution that can be used for any event or any location.

4

Response Framework Timeline Highlighting PMO Stand Up

Figure 1. Shows the approximate time after a disaster that a PMO will be formed. Adapted from
Haddow (Haddow and Bullock 2020)

II. Literature Review
This literature review covers three primary subjects relevant to the complexity and
linear program model, which are presented in Chapter 4. The first part of the review covers
the post-disaster environment, demand surge, and how they relate to project management.
The second major review area covers project complexity and how it is defined and
quantified. Third, a review of relevant optimization techniques that are used in the creation
of the model.
Demand Surge
Demand surge is a well-documented but not well-defined phenomenon that
commonly occurs after disasters and affects many sectors servicing recovery efforts.
Typically demand surge is considered to be the excess cost burden that results from the
5

failure of local or regional firms to provide labor and materials to support recovery
(Hallegatte et al. 2008). From a construction perspective, notionally, demand surge is
determined to be active when typical repair and construction costs exceed 20% of normal
pre-disaster rates (Olsen and Porter 2011). In simple terms, demand surge is the difference
it costs to build post-disaster relative to how much it would have cost prior to the disaster.
This difference often termed as capital losses, is relative to the scale of the disaster, with
larger, more damaging disasters resulting in a larger demand surge (Döhrmann et al. 2013).
Depending on the scale of the disaster, entire transportation, and regional supply chains
may be interrupted, which can impose demand surge impacts outside the affected region.
The local contractor workforce is hindered because they balance an increased workload
with their own need to recover. Like the PMO acting as a relief valve to the local CES,
many contractors travel from outside the local region to work in the recovery effort after a
large-scale disaster. These contractors do so at a price, as the increased cost of logistics and
travel is directly passed onto the customer via increased labor rates or material costs.
(Ahmadi and Shahandashti 2018b). This combination of outside contractors and the
overall demand for repair and reconstruction leads to the demand surge phenomenon and
is the encompassing term used to describe the spike in construction cost during recovery
after a disaster.
Historically, records of cost escalation from demand surge as early as 1704, in
Britain, when the cost increase for roofing materials approached 500% after a large
catastrophic storm hit England, and in 1886 after an earthquake in Charleston, bricklayers
6

commanded a 67% - 170% wage increase post-disaster (Olsen and Porter 2011). Demand
surge has been documented after nearly every major disaster since and is often split into
different metrics such as material cost, labor or wage costs, and insurance claims increases
or losses. Here the focus is on the material and labor cost escalation, and the analysis
ignores insurance claims related to demand surge, as they are not relevant for military
applications. The increase in insurance claims can affect the overall post-disaster economy,
but reviewing the insurance models is difficult as most of them are proprietary (Olsen and
Porter 2011).
Disasters can create a shift in the demand for construction materials as the local
supply is either damaged or lost from the disaster itself or is quickly exhausted by the
immediate spike generated by post-disaster demand (Apurva et al. 2020). Therefore,
demand for construction material reverberates at the local and regional levels. Contractors
bringing in material from further away incurs increased logistics and transportation costs
(Ahmadi and Shahandashti 2018a). The escalation of material costs has been studied
extensively; for example, a forecast demand surge model was built to support recovery in
the aftermath of an earthquake in New Zealand (Singh and Wilkinson 2008). Singh and
Wilkinson’s results suggest that high demand for aggregate and concrete materials create
high local and regional costs which are due to their weight. While certain low density-high
demand materials may increase in price due to demand surge, the United States is
somewhat insulated from the magnitude of price shocks experienced by isolated nations,
like New Zealand, due to the stability and size of its supply chain (Arneson et al. 2020).
7

While material cost escalation should be accounted for, labor cost escalation is
generally where the majority of post-disaster project cost increase occurs (Olsen and Porter
2013). After-disaster, variation in labor costs is more extreme than cost escalation for
materials due to the need to import labor from the surrounding region, or even further away.
While the price increase mechanism is similar to that of material, the labor costs tend to
increase further due to not only the logistics of transporting additional laborers into the
affected area, but also sustaining them, and providing overtime hours, which are to be
expected (Döhrmann et al. 2013). Several studies have shown the effect of demand surge
on post-disaster labor cost escalation. Based on a study of 118 metropolitan areas affected
by federally declared disasters (2004-2017), the average labor cost increased by 20%, but
in one case was reported at 196% (Pradhan and Arneson 2021). These studies also revealed
relevant trends in pre-disaster market conditions that may be used to forecast aspects of
demand surge.
Identifying cost forecasting metrics would enable a PMO to predict and estimate
cost escalation in the post-disaster economy with a higher degree of accuracy, which would
ultimately result in the production of more accurate project cost estimates. Literature has
shown that pre-disaster market conditions can signal how the post-disaster cost escalation
will occur (Ahmadi and Shahandashti 2018a; Farooghi et al. 2020). The models developed
by Ahmadi, Shahandashti and Faroogi were able to skillfully predict percent increase in
labor wages, based on quarterly metrics of the local construction sector. Similarly, models
focused on residential housing have come to comparable conclusions that pre-disaster
8

market conditions can be used to create analogous relationships for post-disaster
reconstruction capacity and timing, particularly regarding availability and timeliness of
permitting. For example, the availability of labor prior to the disaster positively correlates
with post-disaster residential construction projects (Arneson et al. 2020). Furthermore, a
key forecasting metric is how long demand surge will last. It is documented that Peak Labor
Demand Surge typically occurs within one year of the disaster (Pradhan and Arneson
2021).
In summary demand surge creates a volatile construction economy, particularly for
material and labor. This dynamic environment will constrain resources and typically
increase the complexity of the portfolio the PMO manages. Incorporating the increased
costs and resource constraints into the complexity model will capture the unique effects of
demand surge on project complexity.
Project Complexity
Project complexity is reviewed to understand the nature of complexity, as it relates
to stochastic and non-stochastic elements of construction, and to quantify it as a measurable
or manageable variable that can be applied project managers who oversee projects during
execution. Due to the wide application of project management (PM) in many fields, there
is no consensus for what a complex project is, or what makes a project complex (Luo et al.
2017). Through this literature review, a complexity niche is defined in terms of U.S. Air
Force program management and the PMO’s stated objective of construction planning and
oversight in a post-disaster environment. Complexity was used as the primary search
9

criteria in selection of review material as the research tied to it is comprehensive with
respect to what a complicated project is; how its complexity is quantitatively determined;
and how it is, or can be, managed (Bosch-Rekveldt et al. 2011).
In general, the more complex the project, the larger and more costly the project
will be. However a project’s cost is not absolutely analogous with its complexity. Most of
the literature regarding the determinants of a project’s complexity stems from Baccarini’s
original two component complexity concept of organizational complexity and
technological complexity (Baccarini 1996). This was further developed into more granular
concepts such as Bosch-Rekveldt’s Technical, Organizational, and Environmental (TOE)
framework to capture complexity of engineering projects. The three main components of
TOE are further dissolved into subcomponents. Technical complexity is related to scope,
goals, tasks, experience and risk; organizational complexity is related to resources, team
makeup, team trust, and risk; and environmental complexity is related to stakeholders,
market conditions, and risk (Bosch-Rekveldt et al. 2011). Additional frameworks for
complexity in construction projects have expanded the components to six areas, such as
technology, organization, goal, environmental, cultural, and information complexities (He
et al. 2014).
As it relates to government construction projects complexity arises from the scope,
as well as risk and uncertainty stemming from multiple stakeholders, significant political
pressure or external pressures such as a post-disaster environment (Haas 2009). Having
multiple stakeholders and the operational nature of the Air Force, i.e., deliberate and late
10

to adapt to rapidly changing local environment, may drive uncertainty in project timelines
due to mission changes and shifting priorities. The above frameworks lay a foundation for
the two-component complexity model of detail complexity and dynamic complexity, in
other words there is a duality of complexity. Detail complexity covers elements of the
protect that are largely static over time such as project size, stakeholders, relationship
between facility components or systems to other infrastructure, variety of trades involved,
and overall scope. Conversely dynamic complexity arises from elements that can change
over time, often with little predictability. These dynamic elements include internal factors
such as human error, resource availability, stakeholder inputs and relations, and changes to
scope. The external factors include environment, weather events, economic and social or
political issues (Zhu and Mostafavi 2017). Moreover, the post-disaster environment is
highly adaptive, and changes rapidly as more stakeholders, and their priorities, are added
to the planning process, which adds to the complexity of each project and requires highly
skilled project managers (Thomas and Mengel 2008). For example, after Hurricane
Michael devastated Tyndall AFB, there was uncertainty with respect to which facilities
would be rebuilt, whether new missions would be placed at Tyndall, and old missions
would move elsewhere. Ultimately this complexity requires more project management
resources, be it time, money, personnel, or expertise (Baccarini 1996). The detail and
dynamic complexity framework of Zhu and Mostafavi align well with Air Force
construction management processes. The details of complexity can be assessed early on in
project development and thus help appropriately allocate resources, such as having
11

experienced project managers assigned to mitigate the risks associated with dynamic
complexity.
Furthermore, the Air Force typically employs a Multiple Project Management or
Management of Groups of Multiple Projects (MGMP) model. In many cases, Air Force
project managers are responsible for more projects than a typical private-sector project
manager would be, likely for reasons associated with business-model differences. That is,
private firms may hire project managers to account for a growing portfolio because their
revenue potential increases with portfolio size. The literature area around MGMP is small,
but one of the key points of success for MGMP is the effective and realistic assignment of
projects to project managers. Where realistic assignment is defined by the project manager
having both the skills and time, or work capacity and experience to effectively manage the
projects tasked to them (Patanakul et al. 2007). The above literature review points to
requiring highly skilled project managers to manage a complex portfolio in a highly
uncertain environment, such as a post-disaster Air Force Base rebuild.
Despite several standardized metrics of competency measuring the skill of project
managers, it is difficult to quantify in terms of project success. The Project Management
Professional (PMP) certification and Project Management Book of Knowledge Guide
(PMBOK) are well-established indicators of a project manager's knowledge. Nevertheless,
it does not capture project execution acumen, and therefore there have not been effective
indicators of success for project managers with certifications compared to non-certified
project managers (Crawford 2005). As far as methods to balance project manager workload
12

and assignment, several models have been published in the literature (Patanakul et al.
2007). These models focus on hard skills such as technical competency and soft skills such
as managerial, interpersonal, administrative, and business skills. Additionally, there are
models using AHP methods to optimize the assignment of specific projects to specific
project managers (Mian and Dai 1999). These models complement the proposed
methodology in this thesis by aligning the most suitable project manager to a specific
project. In this case, correct assignment increases the probability of project success.
Affecting project success is project manager workload. While the literature is not
conclusive on what typifies an overburdened project manager, some heuristics have been
proposed. The 10% rule says: of a project’s planned schedule in labor hours; the project
manager should expect to need 10% of the total labor hours to manage the project (Skaik
2009). A program manager can balance the 10% Rule with the expected weekly working
hours of the assigned project manager after subtracting framework time such as staff
meetings and non-project-related requirements. For example, if a project is scheduled to
take 100 labor hours to complete, the project manager is expected to spend 10 hours
managing the project over those 100 labor hours. Models based on this 10% heuristic have
been developed for optimizing project assignment to projects managers (Patanakul et al.
2007). Additionally, research shows that the efficiency loss of task switching can be up to
40% productive time loss (Meyer et al. 2006). In essence, the more projects a project
manager is balancing; the more productive time is lost in switching focus between projects.
Some industry averages place the number of projects per project manager at less than eight
13

for high-performing organizations and greater than eight projects per project manager for
underperforming organizations (Cabanis-Brewin 2016). It is unclear if the higher
performers simply manage projects better, or if the high performers manage better because
they are appropriately assigned work for optimal results. The aforementioned heuristics
could be useful when paired with complexity metrics to target a portfolio allocation model.
Optimization Methods Review
Optimization and decision-making methods were reviewed to determine which
methods best allow for the quantification of complexity in a manner that enables models
to be adapted to a particular situation. The literature has identified some methods for
modeling complexity, such as Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Vidal et al. 2011),
Technical, Organizational, and Environmental Framework (TOE) (Bosch-Rekveldt et al.
2011). The analytical hierarchy process is a multi-criteria decision-making method that is
well known and documented in the literature. The analytical hierarchy process lends itself
to creating a ranked index of distilled values by using networked matrices to develop
weighted values for each criterion of the decision. These values allow the index to be
weighted according to the user's preferred utility of the selected variables (Saaty 2008).
Linear Programming offers many types of optimization solutions. Looking to the
problem statement for motivation—finding the optimal number of human resources, or the
number of project managers—one well-known Linear Programming Problem presents as
an excellent analog, the Knapsack problem, and its variants. The basic premise of the
Knapsack problem is optimizing what the knapsack can carry at some cost or value with
14

limits on a budget or weight capacity (Salkin and De Kluyver 1975). This problem has
many variants, such as the Bin Packing problem, Multiple Bin Packing Problem, and
Multiple Knapsack Problem. These variants are largely determined by the constraints
imposed on the problem (Gurski et al. 2019). These constraints can be analogously
reframed with project portfolio metrics to optimize the number of project managers, just as
multiple knapsack problem optimizes the number of knapsacks required for optimal value.
Many well-defined algorithms and software solvers exist to solve Multiple Knapsack
Problems (Lahyani et al. 2019). These algorithms have been applied in some project
management scenarios in the literature as far back as 1975 such as capital project selection
(Salkin and De Kluyver 1975).
Literature Review Summary
In summary, for demand surge, the PMO will need to recognize, plan, and be
prepared to function in the unique post-disaster environment and understand how it will
affect the PMO's ability to program, develop, and execute projects. Demand surge will
present a volatile economic milieu with steep cost escalation trends, particularly for
construction material and skilled labor rates. Part of that cost escalation will be due to
resources having to flow in from outside the local area, which may also present additional
logistics complexity into even simple projects. The PMO can leverage several models to
help mitigate demand surge. Identifying local market conditions prior to the disaster can
help forecast to what extent demand surge may be present post-disaster. Furthermore,
understanding demand surge trends such as the local impact of labor and material and
15

typical temporal trends such as cost escalation usually falling back to norms within one
year will allow the PMO to mitigate some of the challenges of the post-disaster
environment.
To summarize, project complexity is the combined effects of a project's uncertainty,
risk, and technicality. This complexity challenges the management of the project
management triangle of cost, time, and quality for each project. As it is applied to the PMO,
project complexity increases in the post-disaster environment, where high politicization
and frequent ambiguity in project priorities across the portfolio exist. The high complexity
of the post-disaster environment demands effective project management, which implies
that the right number of project managers with the appropriate skillsets be allocated to the
PMO.
AHP, MAUT, and the Multiple-Knap-Sack problem were reviewed as relevant
optimization techniques and are cited in the literature as malleable and suitable tools for
optimal human resourcing. The AHP allows for complexity criteria to be prioritized in the
model to capture contextual factors that increase the complexity, such as increased cost
and longer timelines for material. Incorporating a MAUT allows each project to be
evaluated for complexity. Finally, the linear programming solutions can be tailored to the
decision-maker's risk tolerance to optimize the number of project managers and the skill of
project managers to allocate to manage the PMO portfolio.

16

III. Background & Data
This chapter describes key background information for an Air Force PMO. This
ties together the findings from the literature to the complexity score model developed in
the next chapter. Additionally, this chapter introduces the raw data from the Tyndall PMO,
which is used to construct the model.
As mentioned above, the two-component complexity framework (detail complexity
and dynamic complexity) aligns well with the PMO processes. This is because, in
government construction, the foundational document for a project—DD Form 1391 (Form
1391)—provides details for the project scope and captures most of the detail complexity
elements. As a Department of Defense form this means it is useful for all services and
provides a common document in which to draw the complexity information from even
though here we are only evaluating a problem for the Air Force. These elements are size,
variety, and interconnectedness which are discussed in detail in Chapter IV. These criteria
were identified from the Form 1391s for the Tyndall PMO projects and can be seen below
(Table 1).
Additionally, it is important to understand the roles and responsibilities expected of
the PMO project managers. Referencing the AFCEC Project Manager Guide for
Infrastructure and Facilities, AFCEC outlines key duties for Military Construction
(MILCON) project managers as:
• Manage details involved with meeting the project goals
• Provide information as part of the project delivery team
17

• Be a key participant in executing and controlling contract changes
• Monitor the project schedule
• Track construction progress in ACES-PM/TRIRIGA (software)
• Manage the inevitable project changes due to changes in customer requirements,
unforeseen site conditions, or design errors and omissions.
There is less day-to-day on-site management due to the MILCON process since a
construction agent, such as the U.S. Corps of Engineers (USACE), handles the daily
management of the project and contractors. Due to the reduced on-site duties per project
assigned to a project manager relative to private-sector project managers who cover the
typical project manager duties outlined in the PMP or PMBOK (“Project Managers’ Guide
for Design and Construction” 2008). The above review of the MILCON project manager
is important as it will inform the constraints on the number of projects per project manager
in the model. Only MILCON procedures are reviewed here, as the PMO data used and
modeled for are based on a purely MILCON portfolio. Lastly an Air Force PMO is an
operational organization established in the wake of a disaster, and the model developed
here intends to maintain a leanness to promote implementation and adaptation across
locations and disasters. That is, it intends to inform the PMO decision-makers before major
project decisions are made, what human resources should be requested for effective
recovery portfolio management.
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Data
The data used in the model was obtained from the Tyndall PMO. The raw project
data is derived from the Tyndall recovery portfolio, primarily from the Form 1391s (n =
52) detailing the project requirements and portfolio master schedule. The Form 1391s were
used because they are the first requirement document for a project to be developed and thus
are typically the earliest point at which a complexity score for a project can be calculated
(Table 1). The projects are listed in the general order the Form 1391s were listed as
originally provided by the PMO, so Project 1: “Site Development Phase 1” corresponds
with the first Form 1391 in the file and so forth to Project 52, the project order does not
correspond to any sort of priority or rank as listed (Table 1). Where available, most projects
that have a contract or refined period of performance (PoP) values, in number of days, were
used. For four of the projects, current PoP values were unavailable, and the Form 1391
value of 720 days was used, based on all projects given a two fiscal year period in the Form
1391s. The programmed amount (PA) from the Form 1391 is used as the project cost data.
The PA is generally a rough estimate and is likely to be refined as the design-charrette
process produces detailed drawings from which more accurate estimates can be made. The
Form 1391 narratives were reviewed to glean data for the following criteria: the variety of
construction to be completed (horizontal, vertical, specialty); the types of systems included
in the project: none (n), standard (s), advanced/smart (y); the stakeholders (count); and if
there is any phasing of the project (yes/no). This data is captured in (Table 1), and each
criterion is fully defined in Chapter IV Methodology.
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Table-1. Raw research data used from Tyndall PMO Form 1391 portfolio and master schedule.
Criteria
Project No

Project Name

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Site Dvlpmt Phase 1
Ops AC Mx Hangar 1
Parking Apron
MXS Complex
F35 MUNS Storage Facs
CDC
Afld Drainage
Aux Ground Equip Fac
Weapons Load trng Hang.
Simulatro Fac
Site Dvlpmt Phase 2
Airey/Tyndall Gate
Comm. Gate
OSS Radar Approach Fac.
AC Mx Fuel Cell Hangar
Areo Physiology Fac.
Special Purpose VM
AC Wash Rack
OG/MXG HQ
IDRC/Flightline Kitch/Aafes
Lodging Facs
Dorm Complex
AC Mx Hanagar 2
AC Mx Hanagar 3
FlightLine Muns storage
325th FW HQ Fac.
EM Ops Center/Alt. CP
SFS Mobility Storage Fac.
Small Arms Range, indoor
Chapel
Community Commons Fac
MWR Fields
CE/CONS/USACE Complex
LRS Complex
53 WEG Hangar
53 WEG HQ Fac
WEG Subscale Drone Fac.
MU-2 Hangar/B9310
WEG Parking Apron
AFCEC RDT&E Fac & gate
Silver Flag Facs.
Fire Station #4, Silver Flag
ABM Simulaotr
Fire Station #2
WEG Boat Ramp
CarWash/AUtoHobby
WEG Lg Drone Facilty
Corrosion Control Fac.
F-35 LRS (part of Mx Fac.)
Dejarnette Gate
MWR Marina/Rec Center
Fire Station #1

Size
PA (M)
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

194.0
78.0
45.0
48.0
25.0
41.0
144.0
22.0
25.0
38.0
142.0
50.0
25.0
37.0
37.0
13.0
20.0
10.1
24.0
44.0
179.0
276.0
75.0
76.0
36.0
38.0
20.0
6.7
26.0
26.0
64.0
10.0
104.0
117.0
133.0
70.0
82.0
33.0
8.6
249.0
33.0
8.7
16.6
11.8
3.5
7.0
8.5
9.1
10.0
25.0
40.0
16.5

Variety
PoP (d)

Stakeholders

1620
1170
1170
720
890
623
1170
1230
1470
1170
1620
890
840
840
1260
720
1034
720
1322
720
1120
1220
1290
1410
890
1040
785
673
720
890
865
690
1270
1270
1160
1160
1020
601
1100
1120
790
790
839
984
690
602
690
1290
1350
827
940
640

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
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horz,
vert,
specialty
horz
specialty
horz
vert
vert
vert
horz
vert
vert
vert
horz
vert
vert
vert
vert
Specialty
vert
vert
specialty
vert
vert
vert
specialty
specialty
vert
specialty
specialty
vert
speciality
vert
vert
horz
vert
specialty
specialty
specialty
specialty
vert
horz
specialty
vert
vert
specialty
vert
vert
vert
vert
specialty
vert
vert
vert
vert

Interdependencies
Systems
(n,s,y)

Phases
(y/n)

s
y
n
y
y
y
n
y
y
y
s
y
y
y
y
y
y
s
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
s
s
y
n
y
y
y
y
y
s
n
y
s
s
y
y
n
s
s
s
y
y
s
s

Y
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
y
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

IV. Methodology
Quantifying complexity into a manageable metric is a potential solution for PMOs
to assess projects and allocate project managers to oversee the projects. Here, the AHP is
the proposed method for quantifying project complexity, by creating a weighted
complexity index applied to all projects in the recovery portfolio. The novel use of AHP
would not be the selection of projects as it is frequently used in the private sector, but to
create a complexity index to inform optimal allocation of resources, namely project
managers.
Using AHP to create a complexity index is useful as an indicator in selecting
projects to accomplish in a portfolio with multiple project opportunities (Vidal et al. 2011).
Proper project management staffing will be required to ensure adequate oversight of the
projects based on the project's complexity score. The typical Analytical Hierarchy Process
takes four-six steps to accomplish. The steps are listed below in detail. Saaty usually has a
four-step process and Karydas extends the four-step method to five steps and includes a
sixth, benchmarking step. Here ‘checking consistency’ is step 5, but ‘benchmarking’ is
included within the fifth step if applicable (Karydas and Gifun 2006; Saaty 2008).
1) First, the problem or decision needs to be established by clearly stating the goal
or type of information to be conveyed. How is Project Complexity determined?
2) Second, structure the decision hierarchy. Start at the top by stating the decision
to be made. Then list the key categories or groups that inform that decision.
Next, list the subcategories or criteria that make up each primary group. Lastly,
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list any alternatives to be considered. The primary criteria are Project Size,
Project Variety, and Project Interdependence. They each have two sub-criteria
in the model. All the criteria are defined below.
3)

Third, construct pairwise comparison matrices for the primary group of
decision criteria. Then set up comparison matrices for each group of subcriteria. Table 2 below outlines the 1-9 rating used for each pairwise
comparison. The AHP model's pairwise comparison matrices are shown below
(Table 4-5).

4) By evaluating the priorities from the pairwise comparisons and then taking the
geometric mean of each row in the matrices, an initial weight for the criteria is
produced. These weights will then be multiplied by the weight of the respective
primary criteria in the hierarchy (Jagoda et al. 2020). The final calculations of
weights are shown in the weight column of the Pairwise Matrix (Table 6), and
example of step four process is shown in the appendix (Figure 12).
5) Check for consistency; repeat steps 3-4 if needed. Once consistency is achieved,
benchmark the results if applicable. Consistency ensures that the decisionmaker choosing the priority of each pairwise comparison is not breaking the
transitive property. That criterion A is preferred to criterion B, and criterion B
is preferred to criterion C; therefore, criterion A must be preferred to criterion
C. There is some tolerance in the method if the exact pairwise multiplication is
not perfectly transitive. The generally accepted tolerance is a consistency ratio
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(C.R.) less than 0.01(Ishizaka and Labib 2011). An example process is shown
in the appendix (Figure 13). The model's consistency rating is C.R. = 0.0029
Having more criteria in an individual pairwise matrix makes consistency among all
pairwise comparisons within the matrix very difficult to achieve. Consistency among each
pairwise matrix is crucial for the resulting weighted index to be meaningful for real-world
application (Ishizaka and Labib 2011).
Table - 2. Shows the 1-9 rating levels to use during the pairwise comparison adapted from
(Ishizaka and Labib 2011).

Pairwise Comparison Rating Values
Intensity of Importance
Definition
1

Equal importance

2

Weak

3

Moderate importance

4

Moderate plus

5

Strong importance

6

Strong plus

7

Very strong or demonstrated importance

8

Very, very strong

9

Extreme importance

Creating the Framework
The analytical hierarchy process framework proposed is based on the framework
developed by (Vidal et al. 2011) (Table 3), which is rooted in Baccarini’s original project
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complexity dichotomy of organizational structure complexity and technological
complexity (Baccarini 1996), but the criteria ultimately are used to capture the detail
complexity (Zhu and Mostafavi 2017). Keeping the process lean is important as the PMO
will have many tasks to accomplish as the organization is formed and begins managing the
recovery effort. To keep the AHP lean, the technology criteria used in other models are not
used here. It has been incorporated into system interconnectedness criteria. For example,
if truly novel technology is being used for projects in the recovery portfolio such as 3-D
printing, a separate technology primary criterion may be warranted. It could be included in
the AHP framework by the PMO leadership since the demonstration of the technology is a
priority focus in such a case.
The selected criteria and sub-criteria presented below (Table 3) is a proposed
minimum criteria solution. Keeping the process lean increases usability but does come with
a small risk of being less accurate in capturing complexity. This distinction is important as
decision-makers for the PMO require some level of accuracy, but less comprehensive
metrics to gauge its organizational size and requests for project managers. This is contrary
to the private sector and contractor perspective, where more accuracy can be correlated to
more profits and lower risk or uncertainty in evaluating alternatives. The risk here is
marginal and takes the form of requesting an extra or too few project managers, which can
easily be rectified by shifting human capital. The PMO can gain better complexity
resolution by adding additional criteria. Some of these are discussed in the future research
section in the conclusions.
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Table 3. Primary criteria and sub-criteria of project complexity of the analytical hierarchy
process model.

Project Complexity Hierarchy

Primary Criteria

Sub-Criteria

Project Size

Project Variety

Project
Interdependencies

Project Cost
($M)

Construction
Variety

Project Phases

Number of
Stakeholders

System
Interconnectedness

Period of
Performance
(# days)

Next, each selected primary criteria and sub-criteria are defined within the context of
the PMO and government construction.
1) Project Size: These are easy to see descriptors that are most associated with any project
and are composed of Cost and Period of Performance (PoP) typically measured in the
number of days:
a) Period of Performance: Specified in the contract, this is the number of days it is
expected to take the contractor to complete the project. While the period of
performance alone is not a great indicator of complexity itself, it can be a useful
forecasting tool. Preliminary studies (Teston et.al, 2021) show that the longer a
project lasts, the more likely a cost or schedule overrun will occur.
b) Cost: Usually the most visible or well-known aspect of any project. It is not a great
indicator of complexity itself, but high-cost projects tend to attract attention and
publicity which can add to the complexity.
2) Project Variety: This category covers the more technical portions of the project such as
how many skill sets are required to understand the statement of work and execute. It
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also covers the number of stakeholders. These types of subcategories make a project
more complicated and increase complexity:
a) Variety of construction: This sub-criterion evaluates the number of skillsets
required. Horizontal dominate projects such as roads or utilities rate low, full
vertical construction rates higher, and specialty construction such as SCIFs or other
unique or less common requirements rate highest.
b) Number of Stakeholders: Individual stakeholders are defined as mission owners for
the model, typically the O-6 level commander. When multiple stakeholders are
involved with one project or multiple projects, the complexity increases
significantly. Often this is one of the largest contributors to complexity in a project.
A stakeholder is defined as the mission owner, which is straightforward if the owner
is co-located with the project. If the mission owner is geographically separated,
then a second stakeholder, namely the local Wing Commander or their delegate, is
automatically a second stakeholder due to “influence via jurisdiction” since the
local wing can easily affect the project's progress. Additional stakeholders will
come into play if multiple mission owners or jurisdictions are in play. For the
Tyndall PMO, most projects have 1 or 2 stakeholders as defined in this model.
3) Project Interdependencies: This category captures parts of the project that are reliant
on other factors within the project itself or other projects in the portfolio:
a) System interconnectedness: This sub-criterion captures the technology that may be
new or novel in construction, such as sensors or alarms. Additionally, if the new
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systems being installed are standard technology, they need to tie into an existing
network. Some standard systems are facility alarms, fire suppression, and
wastewater removal system. The new smart technology or the more systems are
linked together, the higher the complexity rating.
b) Project Phases: Straight forward, if there are phased projects where one or more
projects depend on the completion of an earlier phase, there is a higher complexity
due to the dependency on other active projects in the portfolio.
With criteria defined, four pairwise comparison matrices were created to evaluate the
proposed framework. The first matrix compares the three primary criteria of project size,
project variety, and project interdependence (Table 4). The following three matrices
compare each sub-criterion (Table 5). Each criterion is compared to the other criteria in the
matrix. When a criterion compares to itself, the result is always one, which is shown down
the diagonal of each matrix. The preferred or prioritized criterion is given a whole number
value based on the one to nine scale (Table 2). The alternative criterion is assigned the
reciprocal of the whole number given to the prioritized criterion. For example, if PoP is
preferred over cost with a value of three, then the score for cost is one-third. The pairwise
comparisons were obtained from SME input and adjusted to ensure consistency. Once the
pairwise comparisons are completed in each matrix, a geometric mean is used to calculate
the weight of each criterion. Next, the weights from the primary criteria are multiplied by
the weights in their respective sub-criteria to produce the final complexity index weight
values for each sub-criterion (Table 6).
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Table 4. Shows the Primary Criteria pairwise comparison matrix for the AHP model and resulting
primary criteria weights

Pair-Wise Comparison Matrix for the Primary Criteria
Project
Project
Primary Criteria
Project Size
Variety
Interdependence
Project Size
1
1/2
3
Project Variety
2
1
5
Project
1/3
1/5
1
Interdependence

Weight
(%)
31%
58%
11%

Table 5. Shows the Sub - Criteria pairwise comparison matrix for the AHP model and resulting
sub-criteria weights

Size
Sub-Criteria
Period of
Performance
Cost

Sub-Criteria Pair-Wise Comparison Matrix
Period of
Cost
Performance
1
3

Weight (%)
75%

1/3

1

25%

Variety
Sub-Criteria
Variety of
Construction
Stakeholders

Variety of
Construction
1

Stakeholders

Weight (%)

3

75%

1/3

1

25%

Interconnectedness
Sub-Criteria
Phases

Phases

Systems

Weight (%)

1

1/2

33%

Systems

2

1

67%

Before moving to the MAUT portion of the methodology, let us see how a few
projects look using the Form 1391 data (Table 1) broken out into the defined sub-criteria
(Table 7). These sample projects are taken from throughout the portfolio, they are not
projects numbers 1 through 4. They were chosen to highlight the diversity of the Tyndall
portfolio and how seemingly large projects may not always be the most complex. These
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example projects are shown later as we transmute the raw data into utility values (Table 8),
and finally complexity scores (Table 9). With the AHP complete the resulting consistent
weighted decision variables can inform what criteria weigh the most on the decision at
hand.
Table 6. Final weight calculation for each Sub-Criteria, the final weights are also shown and
discussed in Results, note values have been rounded to two decimals.

Primary Criteria
Size
Variety
Interdependency

Final Complexity Index Weight Table
Sub-weight X
Weight
Sub Criteria
Primaryweight
31%
PoP
0.75 × 0.31
Cost
0.25 × 0 .31
Construction Variety
58%
0.75 × 0.58
# Stakeholders
0.25 × 0.58
11%
Phases
0.33 × 0.11
Systems
0.67 × 0.11

Final Weight
(%)
23%
8%
43%
15%
4%
7%

Table 7. Example projects display the raw data gleaned from the Form 1391s.
Sample Projects Raw Data Values for AHP Criteria
Size
Variety
Interconnectedness
Criteria
Project Project Name Cost
PoP
StakeConstruction
Systems
Phases
Number
($M)
(days)
holders
variety
Site
1
194
1620
1
Horizontal
None
Yes
33

36
51

Development
Phase 1
Civil
Engineer,
Contracting,
USACE
Complex
WEG
Headquarters
MWR Marina
& Rec. Center

104

1270

1

Vertical

Advanced

No

70

1160

2

Specialty

Advanced

No

40

940

1

Vertical

Standard

No

Applying Multi-Attribute Utility Theory to the AHP
The next step in the process draws upon Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT).
MAUT effectively applies a perceived ranking or utility of each of the complexity criteria
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for each project; it allows each project's sub-criteria to be evaluated independently
(Karydas and Gifun 2006). In the model, each sub-criterion utility is evaluated on a
percentage scale. The least complex projects have the lowest values while the most
complex projects have the highest values. Using a zero-to-one-hundred percent scale
normalizes the values, used in decimal zero-to-one form, and allows utility curves to be
drawn for each sub-criterion for each project in the portfolio (Figure 2).
Additionally, each utility table was determined to have a stepwise rise in utility, or
complexity, as used here. These stepwise buckets were chosen to be mostly linear steps,
with larger steps indicating more uncertainty, and thus more complexity, for the categorical
criteria. For example, smart technology is still in development of how it will be
implemented, and thus has a lot of uncertainty associated with it. The stepwise buckets
were based on natural breaks in the real data for the continuous criteria of PoP, and an
example of cost is shown (Figure 3). These utility charts were then reviewed by SMEs for
general concurrence of the values.
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Figure 2. MAUT utility scores for each sub-criterion in the AHP. Chart A details the utility values
for construction variety. Chart B details the utility values for systems. Chart C details the utility
values for the cost ($M). Chart D details the utility values for phases. Chart E details the utility
values for stakeholders. Chart F details the utility values for PoP in days.
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Tracking Project Cost to Corresponding Utility Value

Figure 3. Tracking of breaks in the portfolio cost data to utility value.
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Table 8. Example projects display the utility data converted from the Form 1391s raw data.
Sample Projects Utility Values for AHP Criteria
Size
Variety
Interconnectedness
Criteria
Project Project Name Cost
PoP
StakeConstruction
Systems
Phases
Number
($M)
(days)
holders
variety
Site
1
0.9
0.95
0.1
0.1
0.25
0.25
33

36
51

Development
Phase 1
Civil
Engineer,
Contracting,
USACE
Complex
WEG
Headquarters
MWR Marina
& Rec. Center

0.75

0.85

0.1

0.5

0.75

0

0.75

0.85

0.5

0.85

0.75

0

0.35

0.75

.01

0.5

.025

0

As an example, we revisit the example projects (Table 8) and see that the raw data
scores have been transmuted into their associated utility scores. Once each project has been
evaluated with MAUT, the utility value is multiplied by the corresponding weighted
criteria from the AHP. Lastly, the weighted utility of each criterion is summed to produce
a complexity score for each project. An example of the process for the first five projects is
shown, note these are different projects from the four sample projects shown earlier
(Figure 4). This provides the decision-maker a complete list of weighted projects ranked
by complexity. This process is repeated for all projects in the recovery portfolio to produce
a list of 1-n projects from the most complex to least complex. The final list of 52 projects
complexity ratings is shown in the Appendix (Table 18).
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Figure 4. Example of final complexity rating process combining the AHP and MAUT portions of
the model for projects 1 through 5 in the portfolio.

It is worth reviewing the example projects, recall the example projects are not all
represented in Figure 4, and seeing how the final complexity score shakes out for those
projects (Table 9). Note that even with extremely high project size scores in cost and PoP,
as well as having a phase input the site development project is not that complex. Conversely
the WEG headquarters is middle of the road in size and no phase, but rates high in the
construction variety, and systems as well as having two stakeholders result in this being
one of the most complex projects in the portfolio. The Civil Engineer, Contracting, and
USACE complex end up rating slightly above average in the portfolio, and the MWR
Marina and Recreation Center are simple, and are at the bottom of the portfolio's
complexity. These results are generally expected from the information available in the
Form 1391. However, one may be inclined to think the Site Development project to be
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more complex than it really is compared to the WEG Headquarters. The MWR project
includes a restaurant a few other straightforward facilities, but the bulk of the work is
simple horizontal construction of recreational fields and simple marina. These summarize
what we expect to see when one really considers the complexity criteria, and realize the
complexity scores being modeled are realistic.
Table 9. Shows the final steps of the Complexity score process by taking the sum-product of each
project’s utility values with the AHP criterion weights. Recall these projects are not all represented
in Figure 4.
Example Complexity Score Calculation Table
Project Utility Scores
Complexity

SubCriteria

Index
Criterion
Weight

Cost
8%
PoP
23%
Variety
43%
Stakeholder
15%
Phases
4%
Systems
7%
Total
100%
Project Manager Assignment

Site
Development
Phase 1

0.90
0.95
0.1
0.1
0.25
0.25
38

Civil
Engineer,
Contracting,

WEG
Headquarters

MWR
Marina &
Rec. Center

0.75
0.85
0.85
0.5
0
0.75
75

0.35
0.65
0.5
0.1
0
0.25
43

USACE

Complex

0.75
0.85
0.5
0.1
0
0.75
54

Following the determination of project complexity, the next step is to determine the
optimal number of project managers. Project manager assignment can be parameterized in
government project management terms analogous to a multiple knapsack or bin packing
problem. Instead of knapsacks holding a certain capacity of items of some value, there are
project managers “holding” a certain number of projects of some complexity.
Here, two types of project managers are identified, by experience level, to manage
risk in the portfolio management, though any number of experience levels and project
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manager endowments are possible. The first type of project manager is inexperienced and
referred to hereafter as a novice. Novice project managers are included in this analysis for
two reasons: 1) to meet a need put forth by Air Force Civil Engineer leadership to use
PMOs as low-threat environments to allow inexperienced, company-grade officers to gain
operational experience; and 2) to illustrate how the model reacts to extremes in experience
level. The second category of project managers is defined as experienced, expert managers.
These are typically contractors or mid-level government civilian (GS-12 or 13) or military
(field grade officer) employees. An objective function is proposed to minimize the number
of project managers, which is seen as a worthy objective considering each project manager
must be paid. The constraints on this objective function are detailed below (Table 10) and
defined algebraically (Table 11).
Table 10. Lists the model constraints and associated details or assumptions.

Optimization Constraint Details
Constraint
Details & Assumptions
Every project is assigned to a project manager Based on all projects getting funded, and
thus must be managed
No more than 8 projects per project manager. Based on the literature that 8 projects are
the tipping point from high to low
performance
Novice managers may not manage projects Based on the average complexity of the
with greater than 50 complexity
portfolio is 51.
Experts may manage a project of any The assumption that the hired experts are
complexity.
qualified for the most complex projects
At least four novice project managers must be The assumption is that a minimum novice
used
footprint will be required.
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Table 11. Shows the variable definitions and functions for the constraints

𝑛𝑛

Algebraic Constraint Definitions
Variable/Function
Definition
Where n projects indexed by j, where j = {1,…,n}
Where m project managers indexed by i, where i = {1,…,m}
Whether a project manager i, is assigned
xij
project j
Project complexity rating for project j
wj
The allowable complexity for a given
Wi
project manager
Cost of hiring/utilizing project manager i
pi
Objective Function
min Z = ∑𝑗𝑗 ∑𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

� 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 8, ∀ 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑚𝑚}
𝑗𝑗

𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 , ∀ 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛𝑛},
∀ 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑚𝑚}
𝑚𝑚

� 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, ∀ 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛𝑛}
𝑖𝑖

𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0,1}, ∀ 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗

Workload constraint of no more than 8
projects per project manager
Allowable Complexity Constraint

All projects must be assigned to one and
only one project manager
Binary restriction of project manager
assigned or not assigned

The linear optimization was executed using an open-source bin packing
methodology template in Microsoft Excel. The cost data for using or hiring an expert
project manager was found on the Bureau of Labor and Statistics. The salary of an
Architectural & Engineering manager with at least five years of experience was used for
the expert salary. These costs (Table 12) are notional and meant to represent the likely cost
of hiring contractor employees to manage PMO projects, which was the case in the PostKatrina PMO at Keesler AFB. The cost for novice project managers is based on the annual
salary of a 3-year Lieutenant, as CGOs are intended to fill this role in the model.
Table 12. Lists the estimated annual costs for project managers of varying skill levels
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used in the model.

Estimated Annual Cost Per Project Manager
Expert Project Manager
Novice Project Manager
$150,000 per year
$90,000 per year

V. Results
The following section shows the results of the model, beginning with the outputs
of the AHP complexity index. Next, the utility scores for the example projects are shown.
The full utility scores and final complexity scores for the portfolio can be found in the
appendix (Tables 17-18, respectively). Finally, a presentation of the number of project
managers required based on the model’s constraints is discussed in the methodology
section.
Table 13. Shows the final AHP Complexity index weight per sub-criteria

Final Complexity Index Weight Table

Sub-Criteria

Final Weight (%)

PoP
Cost

23%
8%
43%
15%
4%
7%

Construction Variety

Stakeholders
Phases
Systems

The finalized sub-criteria weights of the AHP (Table 13) show that construction
variety, which captures the technical scope, is the prioritized criterion in the model, but the
other criteria are of measurable weight to the overall complexity score. The lowest being
phases at 4%. Without more data points to support phasing being weighted higher in the
model for the Tyndall portfolio, this may be a low-end prioritization of phases as a
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complexity indicator for government projects. Finally, note that the criteria weights sum to
100%, so the sub-criteria fully define complexity in the model.
Table 14. Summary Statistics of the portfolio’s complexity, cost, and PoP sub-criteria.
Summary Statistics
Average
Standard Deviation
Portfolio Complexity Score
51.76
12.40
Portfolio Raw Cost ($M)
53.08
61.8
Portfolio Raw PoP (days)
1004
267

Figure 5 - Line graph showing the range of complexity across the Tyndall portfolio, with inset
histogram showing the approximately normal distribution of complexity scores.

The distribution of the recovery portfolio is pseudo normal (Figure 6), and the
spread of complexity from the lowest of 24 to the highest at 75. This variance across the
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portfolio allows for a broad spectrum of projects, non-complex and complex, in which
project managers of varying skill levels can be assigned. The summary statistics show
useful data that can also support decisions in risk tolerance (Table 14). Knowing the
average complexity and the standard deviation allows informed decisions regarding where
to create boundaries between complex and non-complex projects. This will not only
mitigate risk but allow the managers to be assigned well according to their skill. If the
distribution had been severely clumped or very flat, then it would be the case that a
consistent level of skill would be required across the portfolio.

Figure 6. Plot comparing complexity Scores and the project’s cost. This shows the portfolio
organized by increasing complexity, in orange, compared to the projects respective cost in blue.
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Figure 7. Shows complexity relative to the number of stakeholders in the project. Note that having
multiple stakeholders, while indicative of complexity, does not dominate the complexity scores.

Figure 8. Shows project complexity compared to the respective PoP. Note that the PoP does not
dominate the complexity score.
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Figure 9. Shows the complexity scores compared to the systems included in the project. Note that
smart systems appear across the most complex projects; they are also spread throughout the
portfolio.

Figure 10. Shows the complexity scores compared to the project’s construction variety. Note that
this criterion captures the scope of the project and is the most dominant of the criteria.
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One key result is checking whether one criterion dominates the resulting
complexity score to the point that the other criteria are not useful. Visually (Figure 6) shows
that cost is not dominant, though one may assume that a more costly project is larger in
scope and thus higher in complexity, it is clearly not always the case. Notably, the three
most complex projects have middle-of-the-road project costs relative to the portfolio.
Similarly, comparing complexity to PoP, there is not a trend among projects with the
largest PoP also being the highest in complexity (Figure 8). Though it may seem intuitive
that the longer a project lasts the more opportunity that some dynamic complexity may
arise and cause some sort of delay or overrun, the PoP itself does not dominate the
complexity score. Notably, the number of stakeholders does not dominate either (Figure
7). The literature often depicts stakeholders as the single largest factor in a project’s
complexity, but the narrow definition used in the model may mute the traditional power
associated with multiple stakeholders. Next, look at the complexity score compared to
systems (Figure 9). With systems, we see Smart systems heavy at the top, but it appears
across the portfolio. Standard systems also cover a large swath of the portfolio, while
projects with no real systems included tending to be low complexity. Due to the lower
weighting of the system's criteria in the AHP and the general spread of the systems across
complexity scores, this would not be considered a dominating criterion. Finally, look at
complexity compared to construction variety. We see most, but not all the specialty
construction projects towards the high complexity scores. In fact, only one project with
specialty construction was below average relative to the portfolio. Conversely, the projects
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that are horizontal in nature do tend to be low complexity and can be seen as a clump in
green toward the lower end of the complexity (Figure 10). While not completely dominant,
this skew towards specialty construction having greater complexity scores is expected as
the AHP weights the construction variety highest among all the criteria in the complexity
index. Construction variety is the biggest indicator of complexity in the model, as it is the
criteria that capture most of the scope of a project, but it does not paint the whole picture.
The other criteria are critical to getting accurate and usable results from the complexity
scores.
Finally, below (Table 15) are the results of the linear programming solver showing
the number of novice and expert project managers required to manage the portfolio. These
results are based on the input constraints of the model as written in the methodology
(Tables 10-11) and the cost estimates used in the model (Table 12). These results show that
the PMO would need approximately $1M per annum to fund their project manager element
if fully contracted. Below is a visual representation of the solver output
(Figure 11).
Table 15. Results of the excel solver for the optimal number of project managers

Optimal Number of Project Managers
Project Manager Level
Number Required
Annual Cost ($K)
Novice
4
360
Expert
4
600
Total
8
960

While this results in a minimum number of project managers based on the skill and
workload constraints, the solver output is not the most efficiently balanced in complexity.
Most decision-makers would probably reduce the cost of the fourth expert managing only
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one project by accepting some risk to give a lower-level expert complexity project (51-55
Complexity) to the unburdened fourth novice. Alternatively, the workload could be
balanced among all four experts in a more risk-averse scenario. Likewise, the constraints
can be adjusted to produce different risk tolerance scenarios. Reducing the work capacity
constraint to 5 projects per project manager or increasing risk tolerance by allowing novice
managers to work on higher complexity projects, up to 60 perhaps.

Figure 11. Visually shows the allocation of projects to project managers from the solver output.

VI. Discussion
The results show that the AHP and MAUT methods employed can be used to
develop a project complexity index and individual complexity scores. Notably, most of the
data is available from a project's Form 1391, which can be accomplished in the initial
planning phases of the portfolio development shortly after the PMO initially forms. The
45

one criterion used that needs extra scrutiny beyond the Form 1391 is the Period of
Performance. This tends to have a large variance from Form 1391 to the project's contract
bidding and awards phase.
In implementation the AHP portion of this process only needs to be accomplished
once at the is beginning of the PMO standup. In fact, the model presented captures the
input from many SMEs and active PMO stakeholders. Meaning the presented AHP weights
can be used, as is, for any organization managing a diverse portfolio. Through
benchmarking future PMOs can choose to adjust the AHP weights via adjustment of the
pairwise comparisons or the addition of the criteria in the model. Otherwise, as new
projects are developed, the PMO only needs to accomplish the utility values for the new
projects and weight with the Complexity Index then file into the portfolio depending on its
final complexity rating ready to be assigned to a project manager.
Furthermore, the optimization constraints are easily and highly adaptable to the risk
tolerance of the PMO director or decision-maker. As shown the rote output will minimize
the costs associated with the project managers, but it evenly spreads the projects based on
the skill and capacity constraints. While the goal and result of gaining the number of project
managers required to manage the portfolio are achieved, the even spread of assignments is
not a realistic assignment of projects. There will be engagement by the decision-makers to
assign the projects according to their risk tolerance and the skillset of each unique project
manager once onboard the PMO.
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Table 16. Summary statistics of the Tyndall PMO staffing and metrics
Tyndall PMO Statistics
Project
Average
Range of
Average
Range of
Managers
Projects per PM
Projects
Value of
Value ($M)
Assigned
Assigned
Projects to
a PM ($M)
5
10
7-13
610.7
454 - 876
Comparing the results of the research with the Tyndall PMO’s project manager
staffing, we can compare some of the Tyndall PMO's statistics (Table 16) with constraints
applied in the model and the results of requiring eight project managers per the research.
We see that Tyndall has fewer employed project managers, and most of the managers are
at, or above the eight project limit used in the model. Additionally, the only work capacity
metric available was the sum of the value of the projects assigned to each manager. These
values were also based on the cost data from each project’s Form 1391. A few notable and
distinct differences must be addressed in the Tyndall PMO's employment of project
managers compared to the results of the research. First, the Tyndall PMO is only using
expert project managers as defined in the model. There are young CGOs, or novices in the
Tyndall PMO. However, the CGOs are used in supporting and assistant roles to the
MILCON project managers. This helps lift some burden from the project managers and is
shown to be an effective way to mitigate the risk associated with having more than eight
projects assigned to the project managers. It is not possible to compare the complexity
scores developed directly to the current portfolio being managed because the MILCON
projects are developing in real-time and certain projects have contractually been split or
combined so the current real-world portfolio is similar but not the same as the data used in
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the model. Discussion with several of the Tyndal PMO project managers has shown the
complexity scores based on the Form 1391s and early master schedule are close to what
they perceive in managing the design phases and entering into construction execution of
the projects.
The research is designed to answer the question of how many project managers are
needed early in the standup of the PMO. The Tyndall PMO is going on four years at this
point and has had some cycles of manning increase or decrease based on discussions with
the Tyndall PMO. The proposed model would allow quantifiable justification to request
adequate or additional staffing based on workload and establish an effective baseline to
stand up future PMOs once the Form 1391s are built.
As well, it is worth noting that the portfolio only has two phased projects. As
discussed in the results, this is not enough data to validate whether the phases sub-criteria
is appropriately weighted within the AHP. The nature of government portfolios is tied to
fiscal years and phases are often by design spread over different fiscal years. This spreading
of the phases forces the “next phase” to be delayed artificially from a contracting
perspective and can mitigate some of the risk of previous phases delaying the next phase.
This is often seen when constructing or repairing a taxiway or parking apron where the
whole area will be repaired, but in phases over several fiscal years. Additionally, some of
these large paving projects have hard boundaries that will not prevent the next phase from
beginning in some cases and thus phasing is really a fiscal constraint not a true dependency
on the previous phase. More research on this criterion is needed to clarify how to better
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capture this information from a Form 1391 or another source to use in the complexity
criteria properly.
Finally, there is one outlier project that based on discussions with the Tyndall PMO
project managers, has a severe mismatch complexity with its real-world perceived
complexity. The Airfield Drainage project has become one of the most demanding projects
in the portfolio. With a complexity score of 32, it should be a very straightforward project.
There are a few things to note about the discrepancy based on discussions with the project
manager. First, it seems the Form 1391 for the Airfield drainage project did not truly
capture the scope of what was needed to accomplish the project. This highlights a potential
weakness in relying heavily on the Form 1391 for most of the data used in the model.
Second, it rather bluntly confirms the dynamic complexity at play, as expressed by Zhu, of
MILCON and government construction in general (Zhu and Mostafavi 2017). In this case,
the dynamic complexity manifests as changes to the project scope, interjecting uncertainty
into the project. Lastly, only the Airfield Drainage project was highlighted during
discussions as having the issue of extreme discrepancy of effort compared to the
complexity score. In rough terms, this translates to a 98% "success" rate on the complexity
scores.
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VII. Conclusions
This chapter provides concluding remarks on the research. Including closing
thoughts on the expected contribution to the body of knowledge and highlighting areas of
future research and development of the methodology presented. Finally, the chapter
finishes with a summary of the research.
Expected Contribution
The novel use of the Analytical Hierarchy Process to create a complexity index and
apply it to a project portfolio to inform decision-makers on the optimal allocation of human
capital resources broadens the scope of the analytical hierarchy process and multi-attribute
utility theory. The proposed model increases the application of multi-criteria decision
methods in the construction and project management fields and the human resources field.
Additionally, it is hopeful that this model would be readily usable for any project
management entity, such as an Air Force Civil Engineering Squadron's Engineering Flight,
MILCON management across installation, and not only a PMO in a post-disaster
environment.
Future Research & Development
The methodology presented shows the promise of a new way to evaluate a
government construction portfolio for optimal management aligned with the decisionmaker's risk tolerance. Two ways the existing methodology could be adapted in the future
is to apply the model to a Facilities Sustainment, Restoration, and Maintenance (FSRM)
portfolio. These portfolios are the standard portfolios managed by Civil Engineer
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Squadrons at every Air Force Installation. The model would allow the base engineers to
produce quantifying arguments to evaluate their project manager resourcing and request
more human resources via contractors or government employees.
As the current model did not evaluate FSRM processes a couple things would need
to be done to update the model for an FSRM Portfolio. First, FSRM typically have much
lower cost thresholds and a new cost utility chart should be employed to capture the range
of costs being managed. It is recommended to use the same method described of developing
stepwise buckets based on natural breaks in the data. Secondly the constraints on the project
managers and definitions of skill levels should be evaluated as to what resources are
expected or being requested. FSRM project managers typically provide more daily contract
oversite and mirror more closely industry standards for a project manager compared to the
MILCON project managers duties. The constraint of eight or less projects per project
manager is probably more relevant to the FSRM project manager.
Additionally, the model could be used to inform some contracting decisions to help
mitigate risk. As the knowledge of which projects are complex or less complex can be
leveraged to help in the bundling of projects under one larger contract or conversely
phasing a solicitation to reduce complexity. An example of bundling may be to combine
solicitations from projects that share stakeholders in order to consolidate the number of
project managers interacting with the stakeholders would allow more streamlined
communication and oversight.
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Lastly, there some limitations in the model and future research would help to
clarify or correct these limitations. There was not enough data to make any informed
conclusions regarding the weight of phases as a criterion. Also, the definition used for
stakeholders is quite narrow and should be evaluated to incorporate a more robust cohort
of possible and frequently seen stakeholders in government construction.
A portfolio with more phased projects would help further develop the
Interconnectedness primary criteria and phases sub-criteria. The nature of phasing in
government projects is not always a true linear dependency on another project, so the
weight for this criterion really needs a more robust study. It is also possible it is infrequent
enough to generally be removed from the model as portfolios with many phased projects
may be the exception and not the norm.
Regarding stakeholders it is suggested for future research to identify a few more
critical and frequent stakeholders seen in government projects. Upon reviewing the results
this criterion is a little too narrow as defined in the model relative to what is expected from
the output. To suggest a way forward it is recommended to review stakeholders as internal
and external in general. I think the model captures the internal Air Force stakeholders well
but does not readily capture external stakeholders. Some frequent external stakeholders are
environmental authorities, and local utility companies. Environmental authorities are
almost always involved in construction on airfields, which is of course frequent in Air
Force projects. Additionally local utility companies will be heavily involved in a portfolio
developed for post-disaster recovery.
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Finally, some suggested future criteria to explore are contractor burden, nondisaster contexts, and unique technology use such as 3-D printing. Specifically, further
research into mixed context portfolios would allow a criterion to capture some of the
dynamic complexity that is not captured in the current model. Capturing contractor burden
would require a good understanding of the contractor's resource constraints, which
typically will not be available until much later in the project process as compared to the
information available on the Form 1391.
Summary
Post-disaster projects tend to be numerous, extraordinarily complex, involving
multiple stakeholders, higher cost, and aggressive timelines. These condensed timelines
are driven by Air Force installations' national security capabilities and perception. The need
to show credible, tangible recovery as fast as possible is driven as much by local and
economic drivers as it is to show internationally that the U.S. has not lost any defense
capability. This visible fast recovery adds contextual complexity to the recovery portfolio.
As such, it is critical that the PMO formed to develop and execute the recovery portfolio
be prepared and adequately resourced to contend with this environment. Having a lean,
easy-to-use framework to quantify project complexity will allow the Project Management
Office leadership to compare and assign project managers to the projects at the earliest
point in developing the portfolio. Using analytical hierarchy and multi-attribute utility
theory allows each project to have a complexity rating that will inform the project manager
work demand for each project assigned. Leveraging the project complexity score to ensure
53

the appropriate project managers are assigned and no project managers are overloaded
allows proper oversight and better management of the projects. The project management
office can program, develop, and execute the recovery portfolio to reduce cost and
scheduling overruns. The framework developed in this paper is intended to solve the Air
Force's need to have an event flexible PMO structure. However, it could be applied to any
organization looking to streamline its recovery process by promoting quality of
construction and managing complexity, while balancing resource constraints.

APPENDIX
Table 17. Sub-Criteria Utility Scores per Project. Based on the Data from (Table1) the utility
scores were figured using the Utile Charts presented in Chapter IV Methodology.
Project No.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Portfolio Utility Scores per Sub-Criteria
Cost
PoP
Variety Stakeholder Phases
0.9
0.95
0.1
0.1
0.25
0.75
0.85
0.85
0.1
0
0.5
0.85
0.1
0.1
0
0.5
0.65
0.5
0.1
0
0.35
0.75
0.5
0.1
0
0.5
0.65
0.5
0.1
0
0.85
0.85
0.1
0.1
0
0.25
0.85
0.5
0.1
0
0.35
0.95
0.5
0.1
0
0.5
0.85
0.5
0.1
0
0.85
0.95
0.1
0.1
0.25
0.5
0.75
0.5
0.5
0
0.5
0.75
0.5
0.1
0
0.35
0.75
0.5
0.1
0
0.25
0.85
0.85
0.1
0
0.35
0.65
0.5
0.1
0
0.1
0.75
0.5
0.1
0
54

Systems
0.25
0.75
0
0.75
0.75
0.75
0
0.15
0.75
0.75
0.25
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.25

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

0.35
0.5
0.9
0.97
0.75
0.75
0.5
0.5
0.35
0.1
0.35
0.35
0.35
0.5
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.5
0.1
0.95
0.5
0.1
0.35
0.25
0.25
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.35
0.35
0.35

0.65
0.85
0.65
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.95
0.75
0.75
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.75
0.75
0.65
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.75
0.65
0.85
0.85
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.85
0.85
0.75
0.75
0.65

0.85
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.85
0.85
0.5
0.85
0.85
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.5
0.5
0.1
0.85
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.1
0.5
0.1
0.5
0.85
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
55

0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.1
0.5
0.1
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.5
0.1
0.1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.25
0.25
0
0.75
0.25
0.25
0.75
0.25
0
0.25
0.75
0.25
0.75
0.75
0.25
0.25

Table 18. Shows the final complexity score for each project calculated from the AHP process.

Portfolio Project Complexity Scores

Project
No.

Complexity
Score

Project
No.

Complexity
Score

Project
No.

Complexity
Score

Project
No.

Complexity
Score

1

38

14

49

27

45

40

73

2

69

15

66

28

43

41

49

3

29

16

47

29

43

42

51

4

48

17

43

30

45

43

54

5

49

18

62

31

50

44

27

6

48

19

52

32

50

45

45

7

32

20

51

33

54

46

23

8

46

21

56

34

75

47

50

9

53

22

69

35

75

48

61

10

52

23

69

36

75

49

49

11

37

24

55

37

52

50

55

12

56

25

65

38

47

51

43

13

50

26

64

39

39

52

43

56

Pairwise Comparison of Primary Criteria with Weight Calculation

Figure 12. Shows an example of the “Very Good Method” weight calculation accomplished after
completing the pairwise comparisons.
Detailed Steps to check AHP Consistency
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Figure 13. Details step five of the AHP to check for consistency.

Snap shots of the Excel solver template used in the analysis.

Figure 14. Shows the Excel Bin Packer Template as set up for the project manager constraints.
The visualization was not used in this thesis. The figures used in the thesis were developed
manually or cited of form another source.
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Figure 15. Shows the Bin Packer Template bins set up for Novice and Expert manger constraints.
The width is the number of allowed projects, workload, and the area captures the allowed
complexity constraint. Note that not all the information on the template was used for the analysis,
such as total area.

Figure 16. Shows a sample of the solution output for each used project manager from the Bin Packer
template. Item type corresponds to project number (Table 1), and area is the calculated project
complexity. Not all information was used in the analysis for this thesis such as area utilization or
profit. The cost of the project managers was calculated manually from the estimated annual cost
for each type of project manager and the number of bins output by the software.
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